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Symposium on POFMA: Reflections on thinking about the
POFMA by Kenny Chng
Kenny Chng is an Assistant Professor of Law at the Singapore Management University. He teaches
legal theory and public law, and his research interests are in the intersection between theory and
doctrine in administrative law, as well as stare decisis in constitutional law.
· · ·
The Singapore Protection From Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) has
generated a considerable amount of interest in the public square. Taking into account the way
that public discourse has unfolded thus far, this post will offer a couple of brief reflections as to
how one ought to think about the POFMA – indeed, borrowing a key concept from
administrative law, this post is primarily concerned with the process of thinking about the
POFMA, rather than offering a substantive position on its merits.
Legal and political constitutionalism
First, in thinking about POFMA, it will be useful to distinguish between the concepts of legal
and political constitutionalism. A recurring theme among POFMA’s sceptics is that the Act does
not provide for sufficient legal checks against the exercise of the Minister’s discretion to issue
Part III and Part IV Directions under the Act. Arguments along such lines include those
suggesting that it is problematic for the Minister to be responsible for making the initial
determination of whether a false statement of fact has been made, that it is undesirable that
appeals have to be first made to the Minister before a complainant can lodge an appeal to the
High Court, and that the grounds of appeal to the High Court are unduly limited.[1] Such
arguments weigh in favour of the courts playing a more robust role in the schema of the Act. In
other words, such arguments suggest that legal checks administered by the courts against the
exercise of the Minister’s discretion are insufficient and ought to be strengthened.
It is worth noting that such arguments are premised upon a certain view of constitutionalism –
that is, legal constitutionalism. On this view, the primary means of checking executive power
rests in the law. Accordingly, such a view would accord significant emphasis to the courts, as
the guardians of the law, to serve as the main bulwark against abuses of executive power. This
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is arguably the predominant form of constitutionalism that the US practices. This explains why
the US Supreme Court is immensely important in the American public imagination and public
discourse.
But this is not the only possible view of constitutionalism. Political constitutionalism suggests
that the primary means of checking executive power is through the political process. There are
several aspects to such checks. At one level, the executive is accountable to elected members of
Parliament for their actions. At a more fundamental level, members of the Executive have to
periodically stand for democratic elections themselves, laying open their decisions to scrutiny
and placing themselves at the mercy of the ultimate test of approval. This is traditionally the
predominant form of constitutionalism practised in the UK (although recent events may have
cast some doubt on this proposition).
In any case, the point being made here is that beyond the law, there are other methods of
checking executive power. Legal and political checks are both plausible methods of restraining
executive power. With this broader view of constitutionalism in mind, one might perhaps see
that it is not entirely unjustified to take the view that the POFMA strikes a reasonable balance. It
can ensure sufficient speed in addressing patent and potentially devastatingly injurious online
falsehoods. At the same time, sufficient restraints on executive power are maintained through
both legal and political means – especially since the Minister exercising power under the Act will
have to “nail his or her colours to the mast” by explaining why a Direction is being issued.[2]
One’s precise point of disagreement with the POFMA
Second, in thinking about the POFMA, one should be aware that there are at least two possible
levels of disagreement with the POFMA. At one level, one can disagree with the theory of free
speech underlying the POFMA. During the Parliamentary debates over the bill, the Minister of
Law stated that the POFMA is intended to “combat the deteriorating effect falsehoods have on
trust in public institutions and the democratic process in the digital age”. Indeed, the Minister
argued that a shared “infrastructure of fact” is necessary for free and responsible public
discourse. The POFMA thus rests on a certain theory of free speech – that an entirely
unregulated “marketplace of ideas” will not produce truth and can indeed inhibit the pursuit of
the virtue of civic republicanism. On this view, the “marketplace of ideas” must be regulated to
filter out patent and injurious false statements of fact to maintain a minimum threshold of
quality of public discourse.
One can disagree with this underlying theory of free speech. For example, one can take the
view, as Justice Kennedy in United States v. Alvarez[3] did, that even false statements are subject
to constitutional protection, because regulating false statements would cast a chill on the
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freedom of speech more broadly. This suggests that the expression of even patent falsehoods
has an inherent value. In a similar vein, Justice Breyer, concurring in the same decision,
suggested that “false factual statements can serve useful human objectives”, such as
protecting privacy and shielding a person from prejudice. Accordingly, if one takes such a view
of free speech, one would be understandably sceptical of the POFMA’s underlying theory of
free speech.
The key point is this: if one’s disagreement with the POFMA is indeed at this level of free
speech theory, one ought to bring one’s own theory of free speech out in the open and defend
it. One’s own theory of free speech has to be justified as well. It may indeed be possible to
justify the proposition that the expression of patent falsehoods has an inherent worth in itself.
But such arguments have to be made clear, with due cognisance of the logical conclusions of
such a proposition for the legal regulation of any speech.
There is another possible level of disagreement with the POFMA. At this other level, one agrees
with the POFMA’s underlying theory of free speech, but disagrees with the specifics of how the
POFMA has effected this objective. For example, one might agree that the “marketplace of
ideas” ought indeed be regulated to filter out patent and injurious falsehoods in order to
facilitate reasoned public discourse, but might disagree as to how this regulation should be
effected. Such a view would accept that there should be a power accorded to some institution
or entity to perform such regulation, but might disagree as to who should exercise the power
or how this power should be exercised.
If one observes that this is indeed the level of one’s disagreement with the POFMA, then it is
worth noting that the tenor of argument ought to shift accordingly. Instead of asking “should
we have the POFMA?” or “is the POFMA a bad idea?”, the relevant question would become
“how should we best shape the power to deal with such patent falsehoods?” The terms of the
relevant question suggest that a positive argument is called for. Arguments that “it accords too
much power to the Minister” in themselves, without any credible alternative, run the risk of
losing sight of the fact that one is indeed in agreement that there is a real problem that needs
to be solved. And if one is not in agreement that there is a real problem to be solved, one’s
disagreement with the POFMA in all likelihood rests not at this level but at the level of free
speech theory – and one’s own theory of free speech ought then to be articulated and
defended, as suggested earlier.
[1] For example, see Cherian George, ‘Online Falsehoods Bill: will words in legislation mean
whatever S’pore govt chooses them to mean?’ (Mothership, 6 April 2019) <




[2] See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (8 May 2019) vol 94 (Murali Pillai,
Member of Parliament (Bukit Batok).
[3] 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
